Abstract-In this paper, we propose a novel online centralized algorithm for enabling non-cooperative and energy harvesting capable base stations (BSs) to trade energy in multi-tier cellular networks. BSs are connected to the non-renewable energy source used by a BS when it cannot harvest enough energy to serve its connected users. A double auction trading framework is proposed to motivate BSs with the extra harvested energy to share their surplus energy with BSs that have not harvested sufficient energy. In addition, BSs with energy deficit are stimulated to buy surplus energy of other BSs which results in reducing of the non-renewable energy consumption. The algorithm satisfies truthfulness, individual rationalities and budget balance. Moreover, it reaches the Nash equilibrium. The extra harvested energy is distributed by the smart grid that prevents energy accumulation which results in the waste of the harvested energy due to limited battery capacities. To reduce smart grid usage in distributing energy, an optimization is embodied in the proposed algorithm to assign BSs with energy deficit to near BSs with extra harvested energy. Simulations results show that the non-renewable energy consumption reduces dramatically when the algorithm is applied. In addition, BSs gain more profit, consequently, their utility functions enhance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deploying small cells (e.g., picocells and femtocells) along with traditional macrocells in cellular networks is a thriving solution to meet the exploding demand of the capacity and coverage [1] . Depending on their capabilities, small cell base stations (BSs) are classified into different types such as microcells, picocells and femtocells. Several technical challenges raise in terms of resource assignment, power allocation and interference management when such cells are deployed. The power control of small cells has been studied, for instance, in [2] , [3] . Load distribution for real-time traffic over multi-path networks is studied in [4] where the three-phase goodput-aware load distribution model is proposed. To make the cellular network green, energy harvesting from renewable energy sources for better charging has received attention [5] , [6] . In [7] , a heterogeneous network is studied where BSs in different tiers are self-powered. If a BS has not harvested sufficient energy, it is kept OFF for charging energy, and connected users to it are served by neighbouring ON BSs. The availability region for a set of general uncoordinated operational strategies is characterized. Energy harvesting receivers are considered in [8] where the channel state information is used to find an adaptive beamforming matrix to supply energy to receivers. Packet broadcasting over two-receiver broadcast erasure channel with energy harvesting receivers is studied in [9] where an optimization problem is formulated to maximize weighted sums of receivers throughputs under variable harvesting rates. The energy cooperation between two cellular BSs which are equipped with harvesting and hybrid modules is explored in [10] . Energy cooperation among BSs using smart grid in multi-tier cellular networks is studied in our previous work, [11] , where the fairness of surplus renewable energy distribution is maximized. We propose a decentralized approach for energy trading in energy harvesting cellular networks in [12] where each BS broadcasts its needed energy or extra energy to other BSs at the beginning of time slots. In [13] , the authors study an energy trading scheme based on a double-auction among storage units where energy demands are given prior to energy trades. The energy exchange is performed by the smart grid. In [13] , to maintain truthfulness of the double auction, remaining energy which is not sold in the market is distributed equally among sellers. In cellular networks, where energy harvesting BSs from different tiers are equipped with different battery capacities, this action leads to inefficiency due to overflow of batteries with small capacities. We assume the harvested energy is not traded among BSs and the grid.
In this paper, a novel online centralized algorithm for reducing the non-renewable energy consumption in multi-tier cellular networks with energy harvesting capability is studied. It is assumed that both the harvested and the demanded energy from BSs are correlated in time and are stochastic. We motivate non-cooperative BSs to share their extra harvested energy with BSs that have not harvested sufficient energy. An algorithm is proposed that enables BSs to trade energy in a double auction framework. We find the best response of BSs in bidding. It is demonstrated that the algorithm reaches the Nash equilibrium. Additionally, we show that the algorithm satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance. We demonstrate that in the trading framework, the price of the harvested energy shared by BSs per Joule is cheaper than the price of a unit of energy of the non-renewable energy. Therefore, BSs with energy deficit are motivated to buy required energy from other BSs. The extra harvested energy is distributed by the smart grid. To reduce smart gird usage for transferring energy as well as reducing its usage cost, an optimization is embodied in the proposed algorithm to assigned BSs with energy deficit to near BSs with the extra harvested energy for trading energy. The priority in selling energy is assigned to BSs with high extra harvested energy which prevents the possible waste of energy due to the limited battery capacities. Moreover, the priority in buying energy is assigned to BSs with high energy deficit which increases the energy distribution fairness. The cost of installing large batteries to store harvested energy is removed as the proposed algorithm distributes energy instead of storing it. In addition, the waste of energy in limited batteries reduces.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a multi-tier cellular wireless network consisting of a number of BSs, classified into K tiers. Each BS belongs to tier k is with a maximum transmit power of P k . Serving connected users causes the power depletion in BSs, and we ignore other types of energy consumption at BSs. We assume that location distribution of BSs operating in different tiers is approximated as independent Poisson Points Processes (PPPs) with density λ k . Each BS is equipped with an individual energy harvesting module and an energy storage device. We assume that the BSs belonging to a given tier k have a similar battery capacity c k . Additionally, the distribution of the users location also follows a PPP with density λ u . Here, the users are allowed to connect to any tier and each user connects to the BS that provides the highest long term received power. Depending on tiers densities and transmit power, the average number of users connected to a BS of tier k is given by [7] as:
where P c is the coverage probability which denotes the portion of the users connected to a BS with SIR above than a threshold. The path loss exponent is shown by γ. To find the above formula in [7] , it is considered that tiers are unbiased.
A. The Demanded Energy Model
The traffic rate demand of user m connected to the i th BS of tier k at time slot t is denoted by R m i,k (t) and it is constant in each time slot. Users may request different rates through time slots. The total rate that the BS i in tier k has to serve is
denotes the number of connected users and it is a Poisson random variable [14] with a mean given in (1). The requested rates of users are stochastic. The consumed power of the i th BS of tier k at time slot t to provide user m with rate R i,k (t). Due to the stochastic nature of demanded rates of connected users, the consumed power at BSs is also stochastic. The consumed power to serve each user connected to a BS can be modeled as an arbitrary correlated random process due to the correlation in user traffic and usage patterns [10] . Serving all connected users to a BS consumes 
where T is the time slot duration and the demanded power is constant in each time slot. The energy stored in the battery of the BS i in tier k at time slot t is denoted by e i,k (t). The shortage of energy in the BS battery necessitates buying energy from other BSs or using the energy of the non-renewable source.
B. The Harvested Energy Model
The harvested energy by each BS can be modeled as an arbitrary correlated random process. The total amount of the harvested energy at the i th BS of tier k during time slot t is μ i,k (t). If the harvested energy by a BS is more than its needs, the extra energy is stored at the BS battery. The energy is wasted when the BS tries to store more energy than its battery capacity. Therefore, the BS that has harvested energy more than its needs is motivated to trade its extra energy. The extra energy is traded with those BSs that have not harvested enough energy to respond to their needs. In the considered model, BSs are allowed to sell the extra harvested energy to the BSs that have energy shortage. If a BS which is in need of energy finds no seller BS, it has to use the non-renewable energy to serve connected users. It is also assumed that BSs are connected to the smart grid. A smart grid enables a precise measurement of the electric power by using digital devices which can communicate with each other. When BSs trade their energy using the smart grid, the smart grid operator charges a cost for such service. This cost is an increasing function of the distance as well as the amount of the traded energy [15] . In our model, we assume that distances among BSs are known. When two BSs trade energy, energy is transferred by the smart grid and no energy is consumed by BSs while they trade energy. The stored energy is updated as
where E T (t + 1) is the amount of the traded (shared) energy at the beginning of time slot t +1 and it is added if the BS is buyer, or it is subtracted if the BS is seller. In (2), the maximum stored energy in the battery is equal to the battery capacity. Furthermore, the BS cannot use more energy than the stored amount from its battery.
III. ENERGY TRADING SCHEME AMONG BSS USING A DOUBLE-AUCTION-BASED ALGORITHM
Energy harvesting is not a reliable method to supply energy to BSs as a result of uncertainty in environmental conditions. In order to minimize the non-renewable energy consumption, we stimulate BSs to share their extra harvested energy. To motivate non-cooperative BSs to share energy, we propose the double-auction-based algorithm. It is operated at the beginning of each time slot. A non-cooperative BS, regardless of other BSs, wants to earn money by serving connected users to gain profit. Non-cooperative BSs do not share energy to help BSs with energy deficit. In the first phase of the algorithm, each BS sends a message to the control center. This message contains the information of the tier the BS belongs to, the battery level and the amount of the extra or the needed energy to serve connected users in that time slot. Based on these information, all BSs are classified into two categories, i.e, seller BSs and buyer BSs. Seller BSs have extra stored energy and buyer BSs are with the energy shortage. The set of the seller BSs in tier k is S k = {s
where n k and n k are the number of seller BSs and buyer BSs in tiers k and k , respectively. The set of seller BSs is
Since it is known that a BS is seller or buyer at the beginning of the time slot t, one can display the battery level, the number of connected users and the demanded power from a BS by using the BS index in the set of sellers or buyers of the tier that the BS belongs to, 
A buyer BS b j k from tier k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K} wants to buy
The consumed energy to serve users costs a known price of ζ per Joule for users. The non-renewable energy consumption costs ψ units of money per Joule for a BS. Earning money from other BSs is an incentive for a seller BS to share its extra energy. We show that the energy sharing between BSs reduces the consumption of the non-renewable energy. The smart grid usage to trade energy is not free for BSs. The cost of transferring energy by the smart grid depends on the distance between the seller BS and the buyer BS in meters, denoted by g
, and the amount of traded energy among them. It is assumed that the cost of energy transfer is a linear function of the amount of transferred energy, E T (t), and an arbitrary increasing cost function of distance denoted by Γ (g
and it is paid by the buyer BS. In order to enable BSs to pay money, Credit Clearance Service (CCS) has been used [16] , where all BSs have credit accounts with initial wealth. The CCS is considered to be the control center and auctioneer. We assume that ψ should satisfy the condition ζ + max
A. The Value of a Portion of Energy for Each BS
Consider that a unit of energy is divided into δ equal indivisible portions. A needed energy portion has a value for a buyer BS as it helps serving connected users. An extra stored energy has a value for a seller BS since it may become needed in coming time slots. BSs find the number of energy portions they want to sell or to buy based on ρ
Energy portions values are found according to battery levels so as to enable the proposed algorithm to prevent energy from wasting. To show differences of seller BSs with respect of amounts of the extra stored energy, and to show differences of buyer BSs with respect of the needed energy, each BS, seller or buyer, is provided with a variable u(t) ∈ (0, 1) in time slot t. The variable u(t) determines the BS type and it is a private information of the BS. We define the type of the seller s
. It is observed that the type of each seller BS is derived from its battery capacity and its extra harvested energy. The type of the buyer BS b
. The type of each buyer BS is derived from its harvested energy and the demanded energy. The battery capacity, the extra harvested or the needed energy of each BS are different from the other BSs battery capacities, the extra harvested or demanded energy. Therefore, the type of each BSs is different from types of other BSs. We classify BSs into tiers to find seller BSs types. We define different values for portions of the extra or the needed energy for a BS to reflect the fact that both the harvested energy by a BS and the demanded energy from a BS are correlated in time to the bidding process. We use the defined type of a BS to find the value of a portion of energy. 
where ϕ is a design parameter between 0 and 0.5 that is used to control the values of energy portions for each BS. The values of energy portions increase with step size , and hence, the value of a needed energy portion for a buyer is always greater than or equal to the value of an energy portion for a seller.
B. The Proposed Double-Auction-Based Algorithm
Here, we introduce an algorithm that participates BSs in a double auction in order to trade energy. The seller and buyer BSs are considered to be players that their strategies (their actions) are reporting bids to the auctioneer, simultaneously. The auctioneer is the CCS in the proposed algorithm. The C-RAN, i.e., Cloud Radio Access Network, is a new technology used for cellular networks architecture to develop a promising control center [17] . We use defined energy values and the GroupwisePrice double auction introduced in [18] to design a doubleauction-based algorithm. Consider the seller BS s 
The first term of above utility is earned from users and the second term is earned from selling the extra stored energy. The buyer BS b 
is the amount of energy that the buyer BS b j k cannot obtain from other BSs and buys from the non-renewable source at the price of (ρ
is the seller BS that the buyer b j k buys its q th needed energy portion from it. We assume that each BS reports the real value of a portion of energy as the corresponding bid to that portion. We demonstrate later that this is the best response. The tier of a BS, the amount of energy in the battery and the amount of energy it wants to sell or to buy are required by the CCS to find the type and bids of each BS. In other words, reporting these information is equal to reporting the type and bids by a BS. The BSs are divided into two groups, i.e., seller BSs and buyer BSs, to setup a double auction. Assume that the bid of the BS s q . Thus, sb 
. The CCS operates the Groupwise-Price double auction. The CCS orders and numbers the bids from seller BSs in an increasing order. Similarly, it orders the buyers bids in a decreasing order. In the second phase of the algorithm, a price y is considered by the CCS that does not depend on BSs types to prevent BSs from misreporting their types. We consider that the price is random and it follows any arbitrary distribution between 0 and ζ δ such that the probability of at least one point among 
The above set is used in assigning seller BSs to buyer BSs and determining the price that is paid to each BS. Likewise, for
which is greater than or equal to y, the CCS reserves an ordered pair, (b j k , q), that its first element determines the buyer BS that the bid belongs to. The second element specifies the needed energy portion number that the bid is made for it. Ordered pairs are saved in B o as follows
In order to match the supply to the demand, the minimum of the cardinalities of sets S o and B o is considered and called κ. Regarding bids order, corresponding ordered pairs to the first κ lowest bids are reserved in the set S o . In the same way, corresponding ordered pairs to the first κ highest bids are reserved in the set B o . To find the price that each buyer BS in B o has to pay and the revenue paid to each seller BS in S o , the GroupwisePrice double auction mechanism is used. The CCS finds the type of each seller BS in S o . Consider that u 
, which is greater than or equal to its type. By using the value of energy portions formula in (5), the CCS obtains the variable z 
That is, the buyer BS b This feature is used to prove that the buyer BS has no incentive to misreport its valuation of the portion of energy. Since defined value functions for seller and buyer BSs are increasing functions of BSs types, the revenue that a seller BS receives is greater than or equal to its proposed bid and the money that a buyer BS pays is less than or equal to its proposed bid. Consider each seller BS like s
is stored in the set B a . A buyer BS in B a is shown by b j . As the trading prices are determined, the CCS clears the trades and moves money among BSs in S a and B a . Note that each seller and buyer BS in S a and B a corresponds to a bid of a seller and a buyer, respectively. As each seller or buyer BS can propose more than one bid, repeated elements may exist in S a and B a . Next step is assigning the seller BSs in S a to buyer BSs in B a . Since minimizing the smart grid usage is one of the major goals of this paper, we want to assign buyer BSs to near seller BSs. It also increases BSs utility functions. The distances of BSs are known by the CCS, and thus, the following optimization is solved to assign seller BSs to buyer BSs
where
si,bj = 0 otherwise. The first constraint captures the fact that each extra energy portion can be sold only once. The second constraint follows from the fact that each needed energy portion can be bought only once. The optimization problem in (13) is similar to the travelling salesman problem [19] which is demonstrated to be NP-Hard. Since the proposed algorithm is used for real time applications, the following approximation solution is used.
Approximation solution:
The nearest neighbor algorithm is used to approximate the solution of the optimization formulated in (13) . This algorithm quickly gives an efficient solution [19] . The CCS finds the buyer BS that proposes the highest bid and assigns it to a seller BS in S a that is the nearest to that buyer BS. The buyer BS that proposes the highest bid, denoted by b j , is found from the following formula
Remind that each element of the set B a corresponds to a bid made for an energy portion. In (14), q and q are energy portions numbers that BSs b j and b j require and propose bids to buy them. The seller BS in S a that is the nearest to the buyer BS b j is found from the following formula
Similarly, each element of the set S a corresponds to a bid made for an energy portion. Then, the corresponding ordered pairs to the highest bid of buyers and the lowest proposed bid by the nearest seller BS are removed from B o and S o , respectively. The highest bid of the buyer BS and the lowest bid of the near seller are removed from existing bids at the CCS. In addition, these seller and buyer BSs are removed from S a and B a , respectively. Similarly, the highest remaining bid is regarded and it is assigned until S o = B o = ∅. In this way, the seller and buyer BSs are assigned to each other such that the total smart grid usage is reduced. Energy trades are saved and the CCS updates credit accounts.
Bids corresponding to successful energy trades are removed from existing bids in the CCS. If there is no bid for selling an energy portion or there is no bid for buying an energy portion, the algorithm begins the third phase. Otherwise, a new random price is determined and new sets S o and B o are formed. BSs trade energy in the same way explained above. Regarding a random price and trading accordingly is repeated until either there is no bid to sell an energy portion or there is no bid to buy an energy portion. The third phase is that energy distribution is done by the smart grid according to saved energy trades. The summary of the proposed algorithm is given in [20] . As the highest value of a portion of energy for a buyer BS is ζ δ , the price that a buyer BS pays for a portion of energy in the double auction is at most ζ δ . Since ζ + max
Therefore, the buyer BS has always incentive to compensate its energy deficit by the extra harvested energy of other BSs rather than the non-renewable energy.
We investigate some properties of the proposed algorithm. In [20] , we demonstrate that the double-auction-based algorithm converges and maintains individual rationality of BSs. Additionally, we show that the algorithm is budget-balanced, truthful, feasible, non-wasteful and competitive. Definitions of the above properties are given in [21] . In [20] , we demonstrate that as the algorithm is truthful, BSs bid energy portion values, and have no incentive to change their actions, which is biding for energy portions, and hence, the algorithm reaches the Nash equilibrium. The best response of each player, i.e., seller or buyer, is to report the valuations of energy portions as bids since the BS cannot gain more profit when it does not do this. As BSs bid are found from numbers of their tiers, their stored energy and the energy they want to sell or to buy by the auctioneer, therefore, the truthfulness of the algorithm guarantees that the algorithm runs with the correct information of BSs energy status. Individual rationality and budget-balanced ensure that non-cooperative BSs and the auctioneer are motivated to participate in energy trades, respectively. As the algorithm is non-wasteful, i.e., it compensates BSs energy shortage as much as possible with the available extra harvested energy in each time slot, the non-renewable energy consumption cannot be reduced further as long as the harvested and the demanded energy is stochastic. In the proposed algorithm, we use variable energy pricing to reduce the waste of energy in BSs batteries. High harvested energy in successive time slots results in the waste of energy due to the limited battery capacity of a BS when the energy trading is not enabled. When the extra energy of a seller BS increases, the values of the extra energy portions decrease. As the lower bids to sell energy portions join S o with more probability, the energy portions correspond to lower bids are sold quickly which prevents the possible energy waste in coming time slots. On the other side, when the energy deficit is high, the value of a needed portion of energy increases close to ζ δ . As the value of a portion of the needed energy increases, the bid corresponding to that energy portion increases. Therefore, the chance of joining B o and having a trade with seller BSs increases. BSs with high energy deficit buy energy quickly that increases the fairness of energy distribution. To satisfy these properties, the values of energy portions are defined as done in (5) and (6) . We find a lower bound for the expected profit gained by selling the q th portion of the extra stored energy in [20] .
PERFORMANCE RESULTS
We consider a three-tier small cell network, including macrocells (tier 1), microcells (tier 2) and picocells (tier 3). BSs of tiers are distributed according to PPPs with densities [ Effects of the proposed algorithm, and battery capacities of tiers on the consumed non-renewable power are depicted in Fig.  1 . The sum of the harvested energy of BSs in the network in all time slots are more than the demanded energy from BSs in the network. Thus, the stored energy in the network is sufficient to serve connected users in all time slots. However, the harvested energy by a BS is not enough in some time slots due to its stochastic nature. By using the proposed double-auction-based algorithm, the consumed power from the non-renewable source is reduced considerably. In the initial time slots, the larger battery capacity is not influential. The reason is that the extra stored energy is less than the battery capacity. As more time slots are elapsed, the extra stored energy increases, and the larger battery capacities become more helpful. The proposed algorithm distributes the extra stored energy among BSs with energy deficit instead of storing the extra energy in the batteries. Hence, BSs require smaller batteries to store energy when the algorithm is applied. Applying the algorithm removes the cost of installing large batteries. When the algorithm is not applied, the nonrenewable energy consumption increases as the harvested energy is wasted in limited batteries.
The cumulative utilities of a macrocell from serving connected users and energy trades, when the demanded energy profile is common and two different energy harvesting profiles are considered, are shown in Fig. 2 . In this plot, we compare the cumulative utilities when the proposed algorithm is applied and no algorithm is used. The utility of a BS is found from (7) or (8) in each time slot. Serving users costs ζ = 100 units of money per consumed Joule to users. The non-renewable source offers ψ = 300 units of money per consumed Joule. When the proposed algorithm is not applied, the macrocell gains negative utility values in some time slots due to the high price of the non-renewable energy. To prevent negative utility, the macrocell can deploy larger batteries which is an additional cost. Although higher ζ can avoid negative utility, increasing ζ is out of a BS control. Negative utility values can be avoided in time slots by using the algorithm. In Fig. 2 , the mean of the harvested energy of a BS is less than the mean of the demanded energy in profile 1, and the mean of the harvested energy of a BS is more than the mean of the demanded energy in profile 2. In both cases, the cumulative utility increases as the proposed algorithm is applied.
